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Abstract
This paper seeks to contextualize the 1956 election by providing a summary of the African
American political alignment during the preceding half-century. Winning a greater portion of
the black vote was a central tenant of the 1956 Eisenhower Campaign strategy. In the 1956
election a substantial shift occurred among the historically democratic black electorate. The vote
shifted because of disillusionment with the Democrats and Eisenhower’s civil rights record. The
swing however, was less pronounced for Republican congressional candidates. This paper draws
upon extensive primary material, including countless newspapers, magazines, the NAACP
Papers, and published primary sources to form the core of its argument. Comprehensive
secondary research ground this paper in the inadequate literature on the topic.

Honor Code: I affirm that I have upheld the highest principles of honesty and integrity and have
not witnessed a violation of the honor code.
-Lincoln M. Fitch
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On June 1, 1956, prominent political leaders, campaign contributors, party officials and
hundreds of volunteers met in Washington, D.C. for the National Citizens for Eisenhower
Campaign Conference. The attendees were treated to speeches from President Dwight
Eisenhower and Vice President Richard Nixon, who encouraged them to improve upon the
results from 1952. Richard L. Tobin, the Director of Public Relations, on leave from the New
York Herald Tribune, articulated the focal point of the campaign. In his address, he
acknowledged that the Republican Party was “definitely a minority party,” given the Democrat’s
substanial advantage in registered voters. Tobin concentrated on the ambition of the Eisenhower
campaign to win more of the African-American vote which had, since 1936, gone
overwhelmingly Democratic. He claimed that under Eisenhower, “more advances have been
made in civil rights for the Negro than during the administration of any president except
Abraham Lincoln, and the Negro voter is already beginning to be actively aware of this.” Tobin
explained that Eisenhower’s Administration had abolished segregation in the military, integrated
Washington, D.C., and hired more African Americans in the Foreign Service than ever before. It
was important they also understand their “vested interest in the election of a Republican House
and a Republican Senate.” Tobin suggested that a determined effort from volunteers would
effect a modest switch in African-American vote would turn the tide of the election. “If we in
Citizens could manage to persuade only 5 – 10 percent of the voting Negroes to switch from a
hopeless position under the Democrats to a hopeful and logical position under the Republicans,
President Eisenhower and a Republican Congress would almost certainly be elected under
present circumstances.” The Republican Party believed that their record was more appealing to
African Americans than it had been in over half a century. 1
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Attracting more of the African-American vote was a central strategy of the Eisenhower
campaign in 1956. The Party of Lincoln was not destroyed by the New Deal alliance, as
Historian Nancy Weiss suggests. Instead, Eisenhower’s first term authenticated the Republican
Party’s commitment to equal rights, leading to a historic escalation of support among blacks. In
the 1956, the African-American vote was not a settled question; it was up for grabs. The
Republicans cautiously endeavored to tip the electoral balance towards Eisenhower through
persuading more African Americans to vote for them in 1956. The goal of Citizens for
Eisenhower of returning blacks to the Grand Old Party was never fully realized in part because
the Eisenhower’s pragmatic yet progressive policies were not easily transferable to the national
party nor were they absorbed by the Republican mainstream. In addition, Republicans’ attempts
to make inroads with southern whites, almost all of who were segregationists, undercut their
commitment to civil rights and too overtly courting the black vote. 2

Historiographical Introduction
Republican views of limited government power, states’ rights, and reductions in social
welfare were viewed as being contrary to the values of African Americans. The inability for
Republicans to win African-American votes in the 1950s came down to cold political calculation
and opposing political ideologies, as historian Timothy Thurber argues. He states that, “some
blacks did shift their support to Eisenhower, but these percentages were inflated primarily
because many African Americans did not vote at all.” 3 Eisenhower’s success among black voters
is attributed to the lack of enthusiasm for Adlai Stevenson. The change in the African-American
National Citizens for Eisenhower Campaign Conference, NAACP Papers box III: A 113 LOC.
2
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vote in 1956 is often overlooked in Eisenhower biographies. Jim Newton’s Eisenhower: The
White House Years does not mention it at all. Although many contemporaries observed
Eisenhower’s success among black voters, it has been a largely neglected topic by scholars.
Even the only single volume work on the election of 1956, Shattuck and Thomson’s The 1956
Presidential Campaign, does not mention anything about the grassroots Citizens for Eisenhower
organization that was a major force in this campaign. Eisenhower won a historic 36% of the
African-American vote in 1956, which remains the highest percentage of votes for a Republican
presidential candidate since Herbert Hoover. The 1950s were a transitory period of political
realignment, in which the Republicans under Eisenhower’s guidance led the way in advancing
equal opportunity for blacks, and at the same time they made concentrated efforts to win votes in
the formerly solid Democratic South. Democrats were divided North and South between racial
progressives and ultra-segregationists. 4

Black Party Politics in 20th Century America:
Republicans allied with blacks in order to preserve the “jewel of liberty, within the family
of freedom” 5 in the wake of the Civil War, passing the 13th, 14,th and 15th Amendments to the
Constitution. White “redemption and restoration” in the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s reestablished
white dominance in the South and systematically disenfranchised blacks with partisan election
laws, poll taxes, irregular practices and gerrymandering of districts. Under increased duress,
voter participation declined precipitously. Republican support for blacks simultaneously eroded
during the Progressive Era. William Howard Taft conceded in his first inaugural that black
4
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suffrage had not been “generally observed” and although he wished it was, he did not enforce it
because he did not want “to do it more harm than good.” 6 Segregation in the federal government
and in Washington, D.C. began in the Wilson administration. Republican administration
appointments to federal offices for African Americans was low, little came in the way of
economic assistance to blacks in need, and no Republican president or congressmen made any
serious effort in the 1920’s to ensure Negro voting rights. Meanwhile, Republican presidents
were carefully working to make inroads in the South, promising not to interfere with Jim Crow.
The national party was largely dormant in the South; in many cases, there were not even
Republicans on the ballot. African Americans were offered little by either party in the early 20th
century. However, African-Americans maintained their historic loyalty to the Republican Party.
Some Republican Party leaders continued to lead the way in supporting equal rights. In 1921, in
a speech in Alabama, Republican President Warren G. Harding advocated the passage of an antilynching law. The Negro Star headlined that “the Republican Party assures a Friendliness to
Best Interests of the Race.” 7 Despite Harding’s support, the anti-lynching bill failed in
Congress. African-American voters had come to expect little from either political party. 8
In the 1930s circumstances changed; FDR’s New Deal encouraged many blacks to move
to support the Democrats in 1936. Blacks suffered immensely under the economic duress of the
Great Depression. The political alliance between the Negro and Democrats was “forged in the
cauldron of economic distress,” as historian Nancy Weiss writes. Under FDR the federal
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government’s policies benefited African Americans substantially. Blacks made up 20% (almost
400,000 jobs) of the WPA workforce in 1937 and they had greater access to schools through
NYA assistance. The PWA spent seven million dollars on black schools in the South and
provided housing, almost a third of which was earmarked for black residents. African
American’s support for Democrats grew because of these economic measures, not for their
progressive policies on civil rights. “The two parties really stand for no fundamental programs,”
contemporary observer Ralph Bunche stated. 9 FDR’s administration refused, as historian Nancy
Weiss writes, even “tangential association on racial causes.” 10 The Roosevelt administration did
not support anti-poll tax or anti-lynching legislation. Nevertheless, blacks voted in droves for
Roosevelt. Blacks became Roosevelt supporters before they became Democrats; throughout the
1940s, black support for Democrats was at least 10% points lower than their support for FDR.
According to one study in 1936, 71% of blacks supported Roosevelt while a year later just 44%
considered themselves Democrats. The Gallup Poll, in 1939, concluded that although 82% of
Negroes supported Roosevelt, just 66% expressed hope that the Democrats would win the
presidential election in 1940. 11 In the South, black voting was still low. Poll taxes, white
primaries, difficult registration requirements, and physical intimidation prevented blacks from
voting, despite the fact that the number of black voters grew in the 1930s to a steady trickle as
they joined forces with their white southern allies in the New-Deal coalition. Given their low
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expectations for government assistance, which had ignored their civil, political, and economic
issues for decades, the New Deal was a positive step for them. 12
The Truman administration’s policies solidified black support for the Democrats. In
1948, Truman sent a package of civil rights measures to Congress, including a compulsory
FEPC, an anti-poll tax, and anti-lynching legislation, a commission to investigate racial issues;
and a bill to end discrimination in interstate transportation, which a Republican controlled
Congress did not pass. Later in 1948, he issued an executive order desegregating the military.
Truman’s emphatic stance for the first time made the Democratic Party the party of black civil
rights. Republican allusions to their historic alliance with blacks lacked the persuasiveness of the
tangible benefits that the Democrats had brought. 13
Connections to Communism undermined the Republican Party’s interest in civil rights
since some of the early leaders of the civil rights movement were Communists. In the late 1940s
and 1950s, Communist suspicion was rampant in the Republican Party. McCarthyism
undoubtedly factored into the Republican Party’s unwillingness to champion civil rights causes.
Civil rights leaders who questioned the democratic process, class distinctions, or American
prestige were often portrayed as unpatriotic and pro-Soviet. The USSR used racial inequality as a
weapon to win supporters in the United States and in Africa, Latin America and Asia.
Paradoxically, international pressure pushed both political parties towards cautious reform on
race, given the embarrassment of racial inequality and the mistreatment of black Americans. The
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Eisenhower Administration was navigating between the radical elements of the civil rights
movement and advancing American prestige. 14

The Republican Party in 1956:
When Eisenhower ran for President in 1952, the Republican Party was recovering from
twenty years of defeat that had destroyed its dominance in the North. Voter registration of
Democrats significantly outnumbered that of Republicans. The Democrats had controlled the
White House for the previous twenty years and Congress for eighteen of those years.
Eisenhower campaigned nationally in 1952 attesting to his immense popularity.
The landslide victory in 1952 had, according to Ike, “ominous overtones,” since the
Republican Party had far less success. Republicans had a small majority in the House and a
majority of just one in the Senate. Ike worried that Republicans had not overturned the tide of
Democratic domination, and Republicans remained the minority party. In 1954, the Republicans
lost sixteen seats in the House, surrendering their majority to the Democrats; and they lost a
handful of seats in the Senate to give the Democrats control. The midterm election of 1954,
while not devastating, was a discouraging result for the party and the president. 15
In Ike’s first term, he quietly distinguished himself as a leader on civil rights issues.
Eisenhower brought record numbers of African Americans into all levels of government,
including the White House. In 1955, he hired E. Frederic Morrow as his Assistant on Special
Projects. Eisenhower believed in a limited role of the federal government—that the government
should not over step its authority. With that in mind, he instituted substantial reforms: enforcing
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the desegregation of the military and desegregating the District of Columbia. He also fought
discrimination in employment contracts and appointed pro civil rights judges to the Supreme
Court. The President utilized the federal courts as a means to bring about reform, appointing
progressive judges in the South. For the first time in American history, his administration had
“erased all vestiges of segregation in all areas clearly within the authority of the Federal
government,” Eisenhower boasted in a speech in Minneapolis, Minnesota on October 16, 1956. 16
Ike believed that civil rights were a “simple matter of American justice.” 17 Ike claimed the
administration had “acted on the sound principle of talking less and doing more.” 18 The policy
was of one of “less oratory and more action.” 19 With little fanfare, the Eisenhower administration
made impressive progress within the purview of the federal government. 20
Eisenhower did not believe that federal authority was the primary or best way to
advance civil rights. Speaking to Portia Pitman, the daughter of Booker T. Washington, he
opined that “while we have to change the hearts of men, we cannot do it by cold lawmaking, but
must make these changes by appealing to reason, by prayer, and by constantly working at it
through our own efforts.” 21 Eisenhower lobbied Billy Graham and other religious leaders to take
the lead in making progress of racial attitudes. Eisenhower rarely addressed civil rights issues
directly. He refused to comment on the Emmett Till case in 1955 and the bombing of Martin
Luther King’s home in 1956. The administration ignored pressure from the African American
community to pass legislation protecting voting rights. Sizing up public opinion, Republican
16

Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1956, (Washington D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), 946.
17
Eisenhower quoted in David A. Nichols, A Matter of Justice: Eisenhower and the Beginning of the Civil Rights
Revolution (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007), 280-1.
18
Eisenhower, Public Papers of the President: 1956, 946.
19
Eisenhower, Public Papers of the President: 1956, 1022.
20
Nichols, A Matter of Justice, 74, 90.
21
Eisenhower meeting with Portia Washington Oct 9, 1956 quoted in E. Fredric Morrow, Black Man in the White
House: A Diary of the Eisenhower Years by the Administrative Officer for Special Projects, the White House, 19551961 (New York: Coward-McCann Inc., 1963), 98.

10
political interests in the South and the lack of political will by either party, Eisenhower was silent
in the face of significant miscarriages of justice. He was a pragmatist who preferred to move
quietly, slowly, and without drama. Black leaders applauded his support for black equality, but
were frustrated by his gradualism. Remembering the failures of Reconstruction, the
administration believed black leaders were too demanding; that rapid federal changes would not
produce their desired result. In his acceptance speech for the Republican nomination, Eisenhower
trumpeted that “the Republican party was created in a devout belief in equal justice and
opportunity for all in a nation of free men and women.” 22 Eisenhower and the Republicans were
maintaining their historic support for equal opportunity for all. Eisenhower’s actions reaffirmed
the Republican Party’s commitment to civil rights progress. Yet he would not press them as a
matter of conscience. 23

The 1956 Campaign
In the 1956 campaign, the roles reversed from 1952. The Republicans had to persuade
the people to maintain the status quo, while the Democrats had to convince the public of the need
for change. In the campaign, the Democrats attacked aggressively while Republicans talked in
loftier terms, seemingly above the fray. Democratic presidential nominee Adlai Stevenson
criticized the Republican Party as “guided only by its devotion to the monopoly of money, to the
service of the rich, and to the exploitation of the masses.” 24 The Stevenson tastelessly stated that
the president would not survive his term, that Nixon would become president, and concentrated
their attack on him. Democratic strategy was to revive the New Deal Fair-Deal coalition, and

22
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create an “issues” campaign, focusing on issues like subsidies for farmers, the hydrogen bomb
test, and health care. 25
In contrast, Eisenhower’s campaign focused on his record, contrasting his deeds with the
Democrat’s allegedly empty words. The campaign reminded voters of the “prosperity, progress
and peace” that they had experienced during the last four years. Eisenhower attempted to take
foreign affairs out of the debate and to, as Malcolm Moos writes, “make Eisenhower the central
issue—the Republicans sought not only a presidential triumph, but a Congressional one as
well.” 26 The Republicans hoped to use Eisenhower’s broad-based popularity to return
Republicans to the majority in the House and Senate.

A Wake up Call to a Sleeping Giant: Adlai Stevenson’s Campaign
Adlai Ewing Stevenson II, an Illinois lawyer, was the grandson of Adlai Ewing
Stevenson I, who served as Grover Cleveland’s vice president from 1893 to 1897. He served in
a variety of roles for the FDR and Truman administrations, including the Navy Department, State
Department, and deputy UN delegate. In 1948, Stevenson won the Illinois governorship. He was
renowned for his intellectual prowess and eloquent speeches. Despite his reluctance, he was
drafted for the Democratic nomination in 1952. Stevenson ran with John Sparkman, an
Alabama Senator and segregationist. They campaign promised to “talk sense” to the American
people and stimulate a “reasoned and precise debate” on the “great issues” of foreign policy,
labor, agriculture policy, conservation, inflation, and government corruption. However, the great

25

Malcolm Moos, “Election of 1956,” History of American Presidential Elections, vol. 3 4th edition, eds. Fred
Israel, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., and Fil Troy, (New York: Facts on File, 2012) 1254-1255; Jeff Broadwater, Adlai
Stevenson and American Politics: The Odyssey of a Cold War Liberal (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), 166167.
26
Malcolm Moos, “Election of 1956,” 1255.

12
issues campaign was never fully realized and the Democrats were swept away by voter
frustration with the Truman administration and Eisenhower’s popularity. 27
Active primary campaigning as well as support of party leader in 1956 led to Stevenson
handily winning the Democratic nomination. The Democrats chose Tennessee Senator Estes
Kefauver as his running mate. Stevenson then sought to recast himself in the 1956 election. The
Stevenson campaign was more willing to campaign as if it were a popularity prize and less of an
ideological contest. He took on a record-breaking campaign schedule of speeches, handshaking,
and public events. 28
Reflecting Democratic division on the civil rights, Democrats in Congress circulated a
manifesto opposing the Brown decision. Stevenson “cautiously disagreed,” as The Chicago
Tribune reported. Stevenson stressed that it was most important to “reduce the tensions” that had
led to “shameful consequences.” He asserted that differences could be “resolved through legal
process.” Though he disagreed with his southern friends, he refused to attack the manifesto and
commended their commitment to use “legal processes only.” 29 Stevenson was at best a
moderate on civil rights. He was dedicated to a policy of “gradualism” toward integration. This
policy was often unpopular among black leaders who heard it, along with Stevenson’s
commitment not to use troops to enforce desegregation, as a continuation of the status quo.
Stevenson was striking a precarious balance between loyalty of Southern Democrats and that of
blacks and liberal northerners. During the primaries, his views were challenged by Kefauver’s
more progressive views on civil rights. Yet in California and Florida, Stevenson ran up massive
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majorities among Negroes winning a 3 to 1 majority in Florida and 5 to 1 majority in
California. 30 Despite his moderate policies, Stevenson had strong support among blacks. 31
The Democrats recognized the long odds they faced in taking back the White House, yet
believed that the president was vulnerable. They went on the attack in 1956 in both their style
and amount of campaigning. Stevenson argued that the results of the midterm election was a sign
that the “fog is rising, the fog of half-truths and amiable complacency — and people perceive
that all is not well in Washington and the world.” Stevenson believed his campaign was “a
summons to a sleeping giant.” 32 They needed to awaken the electorate to the reality that a
president who lacked enthusiasm in good health was now in poor health. The Republican slogan
of “peace, prosperity and progress” concealed the truth. Republican prosperity, they contended,
was a result of the Democratic policies of the previous two decades. Where the new
administration had departed from the old there had been problems, as in agriculture. Peace was a
precarious armed truce in the Cold War that they were losing. There was no progress to speak
of, but rather a retreat to Ike’s moderate polices. Stevenson and the Democrats assumed that the
Eisenhower “myth” was vulnerable. They argued Eisenhower had little aptitude or desire for
leadership. His real talent was for misinforming the American people of reality. Stevenson went
on a record-setting campaign to awaken the American people to his view of reality. Following
the convention, he embarked on a 12,000 mile campaign trip even before the official campaign
kickoff in Harrisburg. In that opening address he said the “central issue” of the campaign is
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“whether America wants to stay on dead center, mired in complacency and cynicism; or whether
it wants once more now to move forward—to meet our human needs, to make our abundance
serve all of us and to make the world safer—in short, to build a New America.” 33 The Democrats
in the 1956 election were fighting an uphill battle to shake the American people out of their
complacency. The aggressive strategy of the Democrats seemed to be paying off, as the
Republican poll numbers declined in August and September. 34
Stevenson worked hard in 1956. The campaign waffled in its approach between a high
minded intellectual, and the more marketable aggressive one his campaign manager had devised
for him. He made five policy statements of around 10,000 words, “New America” program for
“Older Citizens,” “Education,” “The Nation’s Health,” “True Economics,” and “Natural
Resources.” His ambitious schedule allowed him little rest and relaxation. It also hampered his
ability to communicate when often his TV image was the opposite of what he wanted. He
appeared tired, distracted, and harassed. His delivery was stumbling and awkward as it had never
been before. Eisenhower appeared more relaxed and more energetic on TV. 35
Early in the campaign, both Eisenhower and Stevenson had committed to focusing their
campaigns on domestic issues. However, Stevenson openly advocated two rather unpopular
stances pronouncing his “end-draft” proposal and his end to testing of the Hydrogen Bomb. Ike’s
thought that the “end-draft” proposal would handicap our military. Furthermore, Eisenhower
said that banning Hydrogen Bomb testing would only handicap our bargaining power with the
Russians, who had been committed to not negotiating on “open skies” among other U.S.
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proposals. Stevenson’s challenge of Ike’s defense and foreign policies were largely unpopular in
the press but popular at his rallies in the northwest. 36
Stevenson rejected the idea that Negro voters would switch allegiances in the upcoming
election. “I am confident,” he stated in an interview with Chicago Defender reporter Ethel
Payne, “that most thoughtful Negroes will continue to support the Democratic Party which has
done so much to help all minority and underprivileged citizens make their most significant
gains.” Conversely, Republicans were cast as the party of privilege under whom the business
class would gain. The Democrats had made the biggest gains for the underprivileged in regards
to “civil rights, housing, social security, minimum wages, unemployment compensation and so
on.” Stevenson asserted that civil rights were “gravest problem we face.” 37 Stevenson took a
surprisingly bold stand in Little Rock, September 25, 1956. He declared that he believed Brown
v. Board to be morally right, attacked segregationist sentiment and quoted with approval the
Democratic platform against the use of force. Stevenson’s commitment to saying the same thing
in the North and South testified to his integrity. However, his unwillingness to enforce Brown
indicated that he would not challenge southern segregationist practices. By contrast, Eisenhower
did not mention the desegregation problem during his tour of the South. 38
Stevenson and Kefauver faced an immense challenge on civil rights from within their
own party. Republican propaganda sought to tie all Democrats to the radical segregationists.
The moderate progressive editor of the Raleigh, News and Observer, Jonathan Daniels, wrote
that Stevenson must “avoid like the plague the impression that you are the best loved candidate
of the Southern politicians. . . . Some of those who most loudly love you are heading programs in
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the South which are repulsive to thousands of voters in crucial areas in the nation.” 39 The
support prominent segregationist Democrats like Eastland, Tallmadge, and Thurmond would
certainly cost him votes of progressive Northerners and Blacks. Stevenson responded, “I know
the pitfalls up here from too much Deep South affection. I had not been aware that there was that
much—unless it was in N.C. but I’m glad you warned me.” Stevenson was delicately trying to
stay in the balance between the radicals at both ends of his party. He continued, “up here the
sensible Negro leaders don’t really expect miracles; all they really insist upon is some honest
progress in the resistance areas.” Stevenson was asserting that his moderate gradualist policies
were accepted by northern blacks. “As for the campaign, I’ll try to go on saying what I have for
eight months. And while denying the virtues or efficacy of force, I’ll proclaim the necessity of
law observance.” 40 Both candidates vaguely advocated the advancement of justice and equal
opportunity. Stevenson was more willing to confront issues rhetorically, whereas Eisenhower
was more willing to take more substantive actions.
Both Eisenhower and Stevenson sought to woo Harlem, which The Chicago Tribune
called “symbolic of the Negro vote.” In a speech to a crowd estimated at around 15,000 on
October 4, Stevenson aggressively attacked Ike for his failure to support Brown v. Board.
Furthermore he lambasted the “misrepresentation” of Ike’s record which, he believed, unfairly
claimed to have desegregated in the armed forces and desegregated in D.C. 41 Recasting the civil
rights accomplishments of the Eisenhower administration as the natural continuation of
Democratic polices, Stevenson accused Ike of “trying to run on the Democratic record.” 42 Then
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he exalted his civil rights record, noting that as governor of Illinois he desegregated the National
Guard, protected citizens in the Cicero riots, and almost passed a fair employment practices act.
Stevenson exaggerated his commitment to civil rights without offering substantive change. The
presidential candidates had almost no substantive debate on how to advance civil rights issues.
They were largely in agreement that it was the role of the courts to adjudicate those issues.
Although Ike left the use of federal troops on the table he was unwilling to advocate that policy.
Stevenson and Eisenhower fought over the past of civil rights reform more than they fought over
the future. The Chicago Defender admitted in its endorsement of Stevenson that “both major
parties and presidential candidates leave much to be desired.” 43

Eisenhower Campaign Strategy: “Trying to Flip the Switch”
Eisenhower deliberately took on a limited campaigning schedule. Yet Eisenhower’s
campaign team fought vigorously not merely for his reelection, but to attain a national mandate
and sweep in a Republican Congress holding on his coat tails. The campaigning strategy had
three facets: firstly campaigning by Richard Nixon, an extensive grassroots organization, and
extensive usage of television. Nixon toured the country speaking on the Republican slogan of
“peace, prosperity, and progress.” He covered more than 15,000 miles, 32 states, 14 working
days, including every politically important state. His stump speech highlighted the way in which
that slogan was true: more jobs, more pay, and farm prices up, honesty in government, out of
Korea. His speech was a foil to the “corruption, communism and Korea” under Truman. 44
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Secure in his polling numbers and his belief in new technology bucked the tradition of
the whirlwind whistle-stop campaign in favor of a national television campaign, Eisenhower, in
contrast to Stevenson, became a “television candidate.” He greatly limited his face-to-face
campaigning and utilized this growing form of media. He used this medium to brand himself and
project his image to the American people. Eisenhower preferred the campaign style of 1956. He
wrote to a friend that “I find the business of relying on the record of the Administration much
less distasteful that I did the type of campaign we had to wage in 1952. I am proud of what we
have done, while at the same time I am the first to admit there are a great many problems to be
talked.” 45 Ike began his campaign with a series of televised speeches that sought to elevate him
above political barb trading. While Eisenhower himself was not actively campaigning, Nixon,
the party, and Citizens were actively working on his behalf. 46
Eisenhower’s campaign featured a grassroots organization called National Citizens for
Eisenhower and Nixon. Citizens was an extra-party, personality-centered organization that was
related to but not controlled by to the Republican Party. Citizens encouraged political activism
on behalf of Eisenhower, especially from Democrats and Independents, much as it had done so
successfully in 1952. Citizens created clubs across the countries that hosted dinners, coffee
hours, and other events that brought people together to support the president. In addition, they
raised money for the campaign, oversaw TV commercials, created mountains of advertisements,
and organized voter registration drives. Historian Robert Mason describes Citizens as an
“innovative” and “promising force” that was at times at odds with the party establishment. This
was a moderate political group that attempted to appeal to moderates and Democrats to join the
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Eisenhower faithful. Citizens for Eisenhower and Nixon capitalized on Ike’s popularity and
moderate policies in winning votes from Independents and Democrats. Citizens campaign
materials focused on Eisenhower rather than on the Republican Party in general, especially in the
South. Citizens struggled to get those voters into the Republican Party fold. 47
Following Richard Tobin’s speech at the National Citizens for Eisenhower Campaign
Conference, Citizens made attracting the Negro vote one of its top priorities. The organization’s
leaders hired numerous African Americans in an effort to appeal to the black community. In
June, 1956, The Pittsburgh Courier 48writer Stanley Roberts was hired as special assistant to the
PR Director Richard Tobin to “develop basic campaign literature regarding the Negro voter.” 49
Citizens had a diverse staff of volunteers and fulltime employees which it advertised in The
Pittsburgh Courier. 50 Citizens focused particularly on winning the black vote in key northern
cities where their vote might make the difference for Republican Congressmen. Citizens, along
with Republican leadership, hoped to use Eisenhower’s appeal to “establish a new pattern” in
order to bring about a “new Republican era,” James Reston of the New York Times wrote. 51 In
order to win their vote, the Eisenhower Administration sought to “represent itself as the
forthright champion of civil rights legislation.” 52
Citizens for Eisenhower and the Republican Party made it their campaign goal to make
inroads with the African-American community. The New York Times reported that the GOP was
looking to “dramatize the Negro campaign for public school integration; it might be able to
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establish a pattern of mass voting in the decisive populous states of the North.” 53 The
Republicans created a $250,000 war chest, the most they had ever spent to win black invested.
They targeted fourteen crucial states and 61 key Congressional races where Negroes might
provide the decisive vote. 54 The campaign strategized that if it could sway even a small
percentage of black voters it would be enough to hold the White House, swing Congress, and
reestablish the Republicans as the dominant party in the North. In this effort Citizens for
Eisenhower distributed a pamphlet titled “The Big Switch—An Analysis of the Vote of Negro
Citizens.” This pamphlet encouraged Citizens volunteers to “get the facts and philosophy of our
President before as many of them as possible.” They believed by educating blacks about
Eisenhower’s record they would orchestrate a “Big Switch” that election year. It was the job of
Citizens to “throw this switch and get the great Negro train off the siding and onto the Main Line
where it can speed forward, securely coupled to the Eisenhower Express!” 55
To that end the GOP and Citizens sought the endorsements of black newspapers,
politicians, minister, civil leaders, and celebrities. The Negro press went overwhelmingly for
Ike. Of the top ten black newspapers in the nation, only the Chicago Defender supported
Stevenson. The Pittsburgh Courier, The New York-Amsterdam News, and The Atlanta Daily
World all backed Ike. In addition, Republicans planned to “send headlining Negro speakers on
whirlwind trips to key cities throughout the nation,” Jet reported. 56 Among them were famous
black leaders like Nat King Cole and Mrs. Crystal Byrd Fausset—the first black woman to be
elected to the Pennsylvania State Legislature as a Democrat. Ms., Dr . T. R. M. Howard,
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president of the National Medical Association (a black medical group), and Adam Clayton
Powell, Harlem’s Democratic Congressmen. Leading figures in the African American
community were leaving the Democratic Party and became a crucial voice in stumping for
Eisenhower. 57
Similarly, the campaign sought to win votes by widely disseminating their cause to black
voters. They created “millions of pamphlets assailing the Dixie influence” on the Democratic
Party. In addition they created pamphlets extoling Ike’s record on civil rights and reminding
them of the party’s historic commitment to civil rights. One pamphlet titled, “Abe and Ike: in
Deed Alike” argued that Ike had done more for African Americans than any President since
Lincoln. 58
Although Citizens eagerly went after the Negro vote, the RNC was more hesitant to do so
directly. White House Aide E. Frederic Morrow wrote on October 1, 1956, “the polls are very
discouraging,” because they showed “a steady decline” from 1952 and “crucial states … are still
in the doubtful column.” Furthermore, “the key role in this whole picture will be played by
Negro voters, and every poll indicates that 90 percent of them are Democrats.” This was odd,
given Eisenhower’s “remarkable record” in civil rights. Furthermore Morrow was disturbed that,
“Republican leaders have written off the Negro vote.” He noted that “little or no money is being
spent in Negro areas and those who have volunteered to try to line up Negro voters are disgusted
with the lack of support … from Republican headquarters.” 59 As Morrow indicated, the Party of
Lincoln faced an uphill battle in making inroads in the African-American vote. A Gallup Poll
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released on August 5 found that while 67% of Negroes believed that Democrats had done the
most for them in the last ten years, just 16% believed Republicans had done more. When asked
“which party would rather you like to see win in this state?” 74% said Democrats and just 21%
said Republicans. Eisenhower fared better than his party, with 32% of Northern Negroes hoping
he would win, compared to 62% for Stevenson. In the early part of the campaign Eisenhower
had seemingly made small inroads but Democrats were still dominant. 60
Eisenhower’s national campaign in 1956 avoided direct confrontation with the divisive
issue of race. He campaigned upon a belief in “equal opportunity” and had demonstrated his
willingness to utilize federal power, where it was authorized, to advance civil rights. The
challenge was to avoid the extremists on both sides of the issue. He believed that “an ounce of
leadership is worth a pound of law.” 61 Eisenhower thought subtle non-confrontational tactics
could bring about a gradually progressive action on behalf of civil rights. In 1952, Eisenhower
campaigned on 14 promises on civil rights, all of which he had instituted by 1956. His campaign
portrayed Ike as a man of action on civil rights in contrast to the Democrats empty platitudes.
Yet Eisenhower almost never took a strong public stand against the infringement upon
black civil liberties. Evangelist Billy Graham wrote to Eisenhower that he was disturbed by
“rumors” that Republicans were planning to “go all out” in an attempt to win the “Negro vote in
the North regardless of the South’s feelings.” Graham cautioned Ike about jeopardizing the
“amazing degree [to which] you have the confidence of white and Negro leaders.” 62 Eisenhower
was carefully trying to grow his support among whites and blacks. This undermined Republican
out to the black community. E. Frederic Morrow was frequently mistreated on the campaign
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trail. He was often at the last minute asked to shorten his speeches as if the Republicans were
ashamed of him. Morrow reflected that “neither the White House nor the party has done very
much to build me up.” 63 The Republicans and Eisenhower were half-heartedly attempting to
make inroads with blacks, but also to win the votes of white Southerners.
In the final phase of the campaign Citizens, the party, and Eisenhower fought with a
greater vigor. The president “has finally come out, swinging both fists against his opponent,”
Morrow observed. Citizens made a rigorous effort to rally Negro leaders to Eisenhower.
Citizens, who already had 450 precinct leaders, expanded its operations in Chicago by opening
two more headquarters. Vice President Nixon and Adam Clayton Powell made speeches to
black audiences attacking the Democrats. Nixon said that Adlai Stevenson is “the candidate of a
divided party with one half paying tribute to the cause of equality of opportunity and the other
half being dead set against it.” 64 This late term push was valuable, as Morrow says; “the
concentrated effort we made in the last few days of the campaign paid off. I also feel that the fact
that a great many prominent ministers came out for Ike reassured Negroes” 65 Political maverick
and black Democratic congressmen Adam Clayton Powell was a major part of this push. 66

Adam Clayton Powell: An Eisenhower Advocate
Eisenhower’s actions on behalf of African Americans made him increasingly popular
among black leaders. In 1952 Harlem Congressmen Adam Clayton Powell supported Adlai
Stevenson for president. He felt Eisenhower “did not have time” to answer his questions on the
number one domestic issue: civil rights. He, along with some other black leaders, resented Ike’s
63

Morrow, Black Man in the White House, 99-101.
Ethel L. Payne, “Powell, Nixon in Bid to Gain Chicago Votes,” Chicago Defender, October 29, 1956.
65
Morrow, Black Man in the White House, 106-107.
66
Robert Howard, “Negro Democratic Vote Break Seen by Ike Group,” Chicago Daily Tribune, September 30,
1956; Payne, “Powell, Nixon in Bid to Gain Chicago Votes,” Chicago Defender, October 29, 1956.
64

24
“say-nothing, do-nothing, think-nothing attitude on civil rights.” 67 Powell and the Eisenhower
were seemingly at loggerhead ideologically. Powell believed wholeheartedly that the
government needed to take an activist stance in advancing and protecting the Negro, while
Eisenhower supported gradual civil rights within the preexisting power of the federal
government. Powell pressed the new administration for reform, especially on FEPC legislation,
and later by attacking Ike’s Cabinet officers as not enforcing the president’s will. Despite the
public prodding, the Eisenhower administration and Powell developed a mutually beneficial
political partnership. Powell met frequently with White House aide Maxwell Rabb to share
instances of civil rights abuses in the federal government and to urge the government for stronger
action. Rabb shared with Powell Ike’s news items and speeches that showed his desire for equal
justice. 68 Powell’s prodding pushed the Eisenhower administration to ensure that desegregation
in federal government was accomplished. The congressmen praised the president’s record on
Civil Rights reform in an article in the Readers Digest in October 1954. Eisenhower’s actions in
hiring blacks, enforcing the desegregation of the military desegregating D.C., and abiding by the
no discrimination clause in government contracts had, Powell said, “without friction,” with an
“absence of publicity,” and with a knack for “quiet persuasion,” brought about a “silent
revolution” in establishing equality. 69 Division between them over their divergent responses to
the rulings on Brown v. Board and the Emmett Till murder complicated their partnership.
Although pleased with Eisenhower’s success, Powell remained unsatisfied, and in early 1956,
derided Republicans and Democrats with intransigence on civil rights.
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Powell became increasingly frustrated with Democratic dithering on civil rights as 1956
wore on. “Stevenson in 1956 was not the Stevenson of 1952,” he wrote. Stevenson and Powell
had met in 1952 and revised the Democratic platform on civil rights, after which Powell
supported Stevenson enthusiastically. In 1956, however, the Democratic platform largely
neglected civil rights and Powell was refused an audience with Stevenson. Powell maintained
that he “could not campaign for Stevenson in 1956 unless he reassured me and the American
people that his stand on civil rights was as forthright as it had been in 1952.” 70 The Republican
plank on civil rights was a shade stronger. Yet the congressmen was unsatisfied, calling both
“not worth a tinker’s damn.” 71 On October 11, 1956, Eisenhower summoned Powell to the
White House. Powell pressed for executive and congressional support for an omnibus civil-rights
bill. With Ike’s support the congressmen put his full weight behind the Eisenhower campaign.
He formed the Independent Democrats for Eisenhower (IDE) and stumped for the Republican
national ticket across northern cities, especially his native Harlem in the 1956. Powell, speaking
in the Democratic stronghold of Newark, to 300 Negro voters, challenged them to “stop being a
rubber stamp” to show the Republican’s and Democrats that they “don’t have the colored vote in
their pocket.” Finally he listed Ike’s responsiveness when Powell called his attention to
segregated areas in the federal government. 72 Inspired by Powell’s activism, the black vote for
Eisenhower in Harlem doubled 1956. 73
Adam Clayton Powell was a political maverick who worked with the Eisenhower
administration on issues, where they agreed. Their partnership on civil rights led to a political
alliance that helped boost Powell’s national status and helped Eisenhower, though not the
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Republicans, make inroads with black voters. Adam Clayton Powell was the leading figure of an
increasingly disaffected black electorate. 74

Disillusioned Democrats
Disaffection between black leadership and the Democratic Party continued to grow. In
September 1955, Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary of the NAACP, wrote an open letter to the
chairman of the DNC, decrying the campaign to deny African Americans the right to vote in
Mississippi. Black voters were bullied by death threats, forced withdrawals, several murders, and
the “State Democratic Organization issued statements indicating it was challenging every vote
cast by a Negro.” The Los Angeles Times opined that “here is the first open and armed expression
of the Democrats from the NAACP in some time.” Republicans saw “a growing disaffection
with the Democratic Party and swing towards Eisenhower when he runs for reelection.” 75
In many cases, the extreme views of southern Democrats pushed African Americans
away from voting for Stevenson. Three black leaders authored editorials in the Pittsburgh
Courier advising African Americans to vote for Ike. A bishop from the AME church wrote, “The
fancy language of Stevenson cannot drown the menacing voice of [Herman] Talmadge.” He
concluded that “negroes should vote Republican to show their appreciation of steps taken for
their advancement by the executive branch of the government.” 76 Blacks had become disaffected
with the division within the Democratic Party. Democratic control of the Senate led to the ultra-
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segregationist James Eastland of Mississippi becoming Chair of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary. A vote for the Democrats was a vote “to make Eastland and the race-baiters chairmen
of important committees in congress.” 77 The campaign attempted to put local and state elections
in a national context. The Republicans attempted to use the segregation issue to sink Democratic
support among African Americans. In April of 1956, the Wall Street Journal reported that a New
York City doctor said that, “Northern Democrats were powerless to move on civil rights. They’re
boxed in by southerners.” Blacks were increasingly disaffected by their “inaction on civil
rights.” This was leading a transformation, as “for the fist time in two decades many Negro
voters are bolting the Democratic camp in favor of Republicans.” These voters were primarily
younger voters led by African American leaders. Democrats unofficially admitted trouble: “I
certainly don’t think we can take the Negro vote for granted this year,” and official of the party’s
national committee. 78 A Gallup Poll between October 1952 and September 1956 concluded that
Democrats strength among African Americans had declined from 72% to 56%. The AfricanAmerican vote was up for grabs. 79

Election Results: The Southern Switch
Eisenhower’s campaign and civil rights record led to considerable inroads with black
voters. The Gallup Poll’s “semi-final election analysis” released on November 4, 1956,
concluded that Eisenhower had gained 21% among Negro voters compared to his 1952 numbers,
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from 21% to 42%. Samuel Lubell analyzed the voting returns in Negro wards from 86 cities,
nearly one million voters. He concluded that Eisenhower won 36 percent of the black vote. 80
Moses Rischin, a contemporary historian wrote in his analysis of the election that, “for the first
time in twenty years, Negroes returned to the Republican party in considerable numbers.” 81
Jet’s election summary was titled “Why Negroes Switched to Ike.” Jet sought to explain the
causes to its readers of what was and observable fact, the black vote had shifted. 82
Democratic incoherence on civil rights had clearly cost them amongst African-American
voters. They had surrendered the initiative the Republicans whose small steps of progress
toward civil rights looked large by comparison. Malcolm Moos writes that “Stevenson’s
equivocations on civil rights undoubtedly disenchanted some elements of the Democratic black
vote and cost him important newspaper support.” 83 The startling lack of support from black
newspapers and leaders indicates a significant shift in 1956 towards support for the Republican
Presidential candidate. African Americans in 1956 communicated their disaffection with the
Democratic Party by abstaining from voting. The RNC research division concluded that
Eisenhower’s 8.7% improvement in ten northern cities was primarily the result of 119,000 fewer
votes for Stevenson. Historian Timothy Thurber suggests that this undermined the campaign
success, which he views as largely insignificant. On the contrary, the Republicans ran a
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campaign to disenchant blacks with the Democratic Party. Declining voter turnout indicates the
success of that campaign and the growing frustration of blacks with the Democratic Party. 84
Chairmen of the NAACP Roy Wilkins wrote that, “there are signs that the enchantment
that the Democrats exercised over the Negro is wearing off.” This disenchantment was not
universal. Wilkins continued, “The election of last November proved that the Negro voter was
highly selective in indicating his dissatisfaction, for while he rebuked the Democrats nationally,
he stayed with them on the levels where they had proved themselves, either individually or in
area politics, to be his friends.” 85 Historians of the 1956 election, Thomson and Shattuck, wrote
that ticket splitting was “the dominant feature of the 1956 electoral result.” 86 In 105 districts
where Republicans were on the ballot, voters went for Eisenhower but chose Democratic
representatives. 87 Eisenhower won more votes than 82% of Republican congressional candidates.
The president persuaded Democrats and Independents to vote for him but not for Republican
Party. Just two of the six Republican senators Eisenhower supported won their races. However,
in Kentucky, the Negro shift made the difference. Thruston Morton—“profiting from
disaffection in Democratic ranks and a shift among Negro voters”—won the Senate seat in
Kentucky by a mere 5,000 votes. 88 Ike’s record as a civil rights reformer and his grassroots
campaign made significant headway with Negro voters that in some cases made the difference
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for Republican legislators. 89 However, he was not as successful in persuading them that to
support the Republican Party was in their best interest. 90
Reporter Richard Lyons of The Washington Post concluded that, in all the cities they
studied, Ike won a greater percentage of the black vote than he did in 1952. The biggest impact
of the Negro switch was felt in the South. In some northern cities the change was “hardly
measurable” and the “overriding issue was civil rights.” African Americans switched in far
greater numbers in the South because southern Democrats were opposed to civil rights, whereas
in the North they were generally for it. Lyons argued that “Negroes can take credit for holding
Tennessee for President Eisenhower. Their switches in Memphis alone were far more than his
statewide margin.” Samuel Lubell concluded that “in the northern cities Eisenhower’s gain over
1952 was 8 percent while in the South the same Southern Negro wards and precincts which gave
Eisenhower 19 percent of their vote in 1952 gave him 47 per cent in 1956.” 91 Black leaders in
the South explained that blacks switched because of the need for a two party system, Ike’s
record, resentment against southern segregationists, and greater confidence in Eisenhower as a
military leader. George Lee, a black GOP leader and insurance salesmen in Memphis,
Tennessee asserted that Eisenhower “listed the Negro closer to first-class citizenship than any
president since Abraham Lincoln.” 92 Conversely, African Americans in the North were skeptical
of Eisenhower’s commitment to economic justice. They voted in large part with the Democrats
because of the improvements the New Deal had wrought for them and future economic aid
benefits Stevenson promised. To them, the Republicans were still the party of big business.
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Lubell wrote that they were divided “between their anger over incidents of racial violence in the
South and the economic attachment they feel to the Democratic Party.” However, even a
marginal eight percent increase among northern black was still a success for Citizens. 93
Republican gains were limited; Roy Wilkins wrote, they “demonstrated their ineptitude in
expanding their gains.” Eisenhower’s pragmatic and political commitment to steady progress on
civil rights did not satisfy black voters. Furthermore, neither party was comfortable in overtly
addressing civil rights issues. Wilkins criticized, “they can add to their advances if they will
cease acting as though they were ashamed to be forthright on the issues, one of which is the right
to vote.” 94 E. Frederic Morrow echoed similar sentiments, stating that White House and RNC
efforts to recruit black support “all along [were] lukewarm.” He suggests that Republicans
believed blacks were indebted to the party of Lincoln. Morrow believed that Republicans should
have treated blacks as normal citizens. 95 The Republican Party and the Eisenhower
Administration were reluctant to go after the black vote because they wanted to campaign
nationally as the party of consensus and they wanted to make inroads with southern whites. The
Citizens for Eisenhower made a concerted effort, but lacking the full support of the Republican
party, they could not bring about a major political shift in the black vote. The Eisenhower and
the Republican’s political calculations prevented them from fully restoring the perception that it
was the party of civil rights.
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The Significance of the Switch
Eisenhower’s unique campaign organization, his record of supporting civil rights, his
disaffection with democratic intransigence, and his popular appeal led him to his success
amongst African Americans, which helped him win an overwhelming victory in 1956. His mass
appeal was unable to draw Negro voters into the Republican Party either for congressional
elections in 1956 or for the long term. Eisenhower’s overwhelming national victory and his
substantial gains were indicative of the popularity of his person and policies, but not his party.
The Republican Party would lose on the national level. Eisenhower was the first president since
Zachary Taylor to be elected without winning control of either the House or the Senate.
Eisenhower’s popularity was not able to transfer to his party. “I readily admit that the public in
general does not believe that my own convictions are yet largely characteristic of the Republican
Party as a whole,” Ike wrote to Anthony Parshley, an Episcopal Priest, after the election. 96 This
was markedly true for African Americans. Jet reasoned that blacks “favored Eisenhower as a
personality rather than as head of the GOP.” 97 Despite its limitation, Eisenhower’s campaign
was able to flip the switch and bring back many African-American voters in an election that
reminds us that the narrative of the black party politics is more nuanced and complicated than we
have historically thought. The New Deal did not cement a political realignment; while many
African Americans were willing to support Democrats for social welfare policy, that support was
hesitant at best. African Americans were discontent with the Democratic dithering, division, and
detachment on civil rights. The Eisenhower Administration commitment to equal justice, the
targeted campaign efforts, and the Republican Party’s historical appeal led to a throwing of the
switch.
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Photo Appendix

This full page advertisement was consistent with other Democratic ads portraying Stevenson as
the man of the people. 98
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NAACP Papers, box IX: 43, LOC.
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This leaflet was a Republican attack advertisement used to stimulate black support for
Republican Congressional candidates. 99
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NAACP Papers box III: 113A, LOC.
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This Democratic attack ad was a page from a larger pamphlet that compared Eisenhower and
Stevenson on civil rights. 100

100

NAACP Papers, box III: 113A, LOC.
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